Afghan army could not enough to fight back and let the Taliban take over the country Afghanistan?

by web desk 

The Afghan security forces, which were trained by the United States, began to collapse in the face of the resurgence of the Taliban after the agreement signed between the US and the Taliban in February 2020. One of the main reasons for this collapse was the loss of morale. This has been seen in many cases where parts of the Afghan security forces have decided to strike a deal with the Taliban for a negotiated surrender. Rather than fighting to defend President Ashraf Ghani's government in Kabul.

The full recent interim report released by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) on the "collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces" points to many factors that have led to this loss of morale and the eventual collapse of the Afghan security forces. He places the blame for this collapse on various parties. Including the US and the Afghan government/army. The link to the full report is below. I recommend anyone interested in this topic to read it. It's quite an eye opener. It highlights why the Afghan government and military forces have failed despite support for some two decades.

Main factors are underneath:

1. Signing of the US-Taliban Agreement - The signing of the agreement between the United States and the Taliban was seen by many as a betrayal. Moreover, it showed the Afghan security forces that the US was no longer invested in Afghanistan's future. Some Afghan commanders identified this as one of the main factors. The fact that some of these deals involved the release of thousands of Taliban fighters (including veteran commanders) did not help matters. The soldiers lost courage and realized that their defeat was now inevitable. This led to many making deals with the Taliban to secure their own future.
2. Staying out of the loop – The manner in which the US withdrew from Afghanistan made matters worse. Afghan security forces were often kept out of reach, further demoralizing them. The withdrawal of American troops from Bagram airfield in July 2021 serves as a good example. American soldiers cut off electricity and left the military base in the middle of the night without informing Afghan commanders or soldiers who were stationed outside the base. Afghan security forces found this out hours later when they spotted the men looting the base. This helped create the impression that the US was handing over Afghanistan to the Taliban.
3. Lack of a military institution – Afghanistan has lacked a pre-existing military institution since the abolition of the Afghan army in the late 20th century. The Afghan security forces had to be built from scratch. Professional military forces take a long time to prepare. Most countries with capable militaries often have a long military tradition or a military tradition inherited from a predecessor state.
4. Inability to stand on its own two feet – The US never designed the Afghan military to stand on its own two feet without US support. At least not for the next few decades. The Afghan army was dependent on the US for logistics. It lacked the logistical capacity to provide arms, ammunition, supplies, etc. to the Afghan forces spread across Afghanistan. For example, the Afghan air force, which has not yet become self-sufficient, suffered from a similar problem. It depended on the US for maintenance and assistance. The US withdrawal will soon cripple the Afghan Air Force, which used to be one of the biggest tools against the Taliban. The Afghan army was completely dependent on the presence of the US or suppliers to maintain advanced equipment. Inexperienced Afghan military commanders with only a decade or two of experience still depended on the expertise of American commanders for assistance. The Afghan military has also been dependent on US forces for critical missions or objectives in the conflict. For example, air support, healthcare, logistics and intelligence gathering. To put it plainly, the US had very unrealistic goals of pushing through a decades-long process in a much shorter time frame. This resulted in the army not being prepared to stand on its own two feet without support.
5. Different traditions of warfare – The traditions of warfare in Afghanistan were quite different from those of the United States. Until the collapse of the Afghan forces, the US did not take these differences into account. The culture of warfare and politics in Afghanistan was closer to a medieval feudal state than seen in most modern states. It is based less on ideologies and more on short-term benefits or tribalism. It is common for parties to switch sides in the middle of a conflict. This was noted during the 2001 invasion of the United States, when many parties switched sides overnight. The same thing happened during the Taliban resurgence, when groups affiliated with the security forces negotiated with the Taliban for surrender.
6. High casualty rate – The casualty rate of Afghan security forces has been extremely high. This got worse in the last few years before the US withdrawal. Such a high death toll is never good for morale. Afghan security forces are estimated to have had one of the highest casualties and casualties in the world. For example, it is estimated that around ten thousand members of the Afghan security forces died in 2017 alone. The monthly attrition rate is believed to have been around five thousand.
7. Unpaid Soldiers – It has been widely known for centuries that the best way to ensure loyalty and morale in an army is to pay them well. The Afghan leadership (both political and military) ignored this simple principle. It was quite common for Afghan soldiers to be kept on duty without being paid for long periods of time. Corruption at higher levels meant that only a fraction of the pay would get into the hands of the men fighting on the front line. The situation was sometimes so bad that many soldiers saw the US as a force holding the Afghan leadership accountable to ensure they got paid. The US withdrawal further damaged morale as many questioned where their next paycheck would come from. During the Taliban resurgence period, many soldiers did not get paid for many months. This led to a large number of people choosing to surrender to the Taliban.
8. Excessive Corruption – Stories of corruption of Afghan government officials and military commanders are well known. Corruption was widespread in the Afghan ministries of defense and interior. It was quite common for funds, ammunition, supplies, weapons and food supplies to "disappear" before they even reached the troops fighting on the ground. Sometimes these things ended up in the hands of the Taliban through the black market. Some military commanders were known to embezzle or steal money by exaggerating the number of soldiers (spirit soldiers) under their command. A perfect example is the fact that Ashraf Ghani himself was accused of fleeing the country full of cash worth about 150 million USD. This set of conditions does not exactly encourage men to lay down their lives for their superior officers or the government in Kabul.
9. Interference by the Kabul government – ​​Interference in the affairs of the Afghan security forces by Ashraf Ghani himself and his government has made the situation worse. The former president lacked any national security plan to halt the Taliban's advance. Ghani and his inner circle tried to centralize power to direct the war themselves. Despite the fact that none of them had any real military experience. As the Taliban moved closer to Kabul, Ashraf Ghani dealt with imagined threats from his own military command. Instead, he has spent the past few months crippling the war effort against the Taliban out of paranoia that the Afghan military might remove him in a coup. Ashraf Ghani began to reshuffle many senior security officials and military commanders on the battlefield based on their loyalty to him personally. His actions led to a loss of morale among the security forces
10. Taliban Propaganda – The Taliban took full advantage of the mistakes made by the US and the Afghan government to further destroy morale among the Afghan forces. Taliban propaganda promoted the idea that the US had left the Afghan security forces at the mercy of the Taliban. This, combined with promises of rewards and leniency for surrender, left many soldiers with little reason to resist. The Afghan government, by comparison, has failed miserably in countering the Taliban's propaganda machine of its own to keep the morale of the security forces high.
11. Lack of ideological belief – A cohesive core ideology helps maintain morale in the military. Put simply, why on earth do men think they are fighting a war? There was no coherent core ideology for Afghan soldiers. A weak national identity and the presence of tribalism in Afghan society meant that there was no real sense of national duty. They did not fight to defend their homeland because the Taliban were their countrymen. They could not even justify the conflict ideologically from the point of view of religion, as the Taliban already claimed this ideological justification. No Afghan soldiers fought to defend President Ashraf Ghani in Kabul. Few were still willing to die for a government in Kabul that was widely perceived as corrupt and illegitimate. Some Afghan soldiers fought to protect their homes. But for many others, the conflict against the Taliban was just a paycheck. This meant they had no reason to fight when the tide turned and the checks stopped coming.